我们为什么要接种疫苗？你绝对想不到！

 

但是如果你关心别人，那么你会关心谁呢？在RafaelAhlskog的博士毕业论文中，他讨论了狭义和广义意义上的关心别人——利他主义。狭义的利他主义包括最亲近的人——家人和朋友，广义的利他主义则包括你从未见过的陌生人，离你很远的人或者是和你很不同的人，简言之就是一种更宽广的关系社会。一系列调查的结果显示这两种利他主义都会影响我们接种疫苗的意愿，但是影响的人群不同。

 

“在一个人有家庭和小孩之前，似乎是广义的利他主义影响了接种疫苗的决定，但是当一个人有了家庭和孩子之后，这种广义利他主义就会让出一部分给狭义利他主义。”RafaelAhlskog说道。

 

这些知识对未来设计疫苗活动至关重要，但是也强调了一种更深的进化逻辑，就是现代人存在以下的情况：作为社会人，在某些情况下我们会考虑广大的社会关系，但是当我们涉及到繁衍和生存的进化“核心价值观”时，我们往往会忘掉这种广义的利他主义。

 

ABSTRACT:

 

Vaccinesfamouslypossesspositiveexternalitiesthatmakethemsusceptibletothecollectiveactiondilemma:whenIgetvaccinated,Iprotectnotonlymyself,butalsothosewhoImightotherwisehaveinfected.Thus,somepeoplewillhaveanincentivetofreerideontheimmunityofothers.Inapopulationofrationalagents,thecriticallevelofvaccinationuptakerequiredforherdimmunitywillthereforebedifficulttoattaininthelongrun,whichposesdifficultiesfordiseaseeradication.Inthisdoctoraldissertation,Iexploredifferentimplicationsofthecollectiveactiondilemmaofvaccination,anddifferentwaysofamelioratingit.First:giventhatcoercionorforcecouldsolvethedilemma,anddemocraciesmaybelesslikelytoengageinpoliciesthatviolatethephysicalintegrityofcitizens,democraciesmayalsobeatadisadvantagecomparedtonon-democracieswhensecuringherdimmunity.InessayI,Ishowthatthisis,empirically,indeedthecase.Barringtheuseofextensivecoercionthereforenecessitatesothersolutions.InessayII,Ihighlighttheexceptiontoindividualrationalityfoundinother-regardingmotivationssuchasaltruism.Ourmoralpsychologyhaslikelyevolvedtotakeother'swelfareintoaccount,buttheextentofourprosocialmotivationsvary:awiderformofaltruismthatencompassesnotjustfamilyorfriends,butstrangers,islikelytogivewaytoamorenarrowformwhenhumanspair-bondandhavechildren.Thisdynamicisshowntoapplytothesentimentsunderlyingvaccinationbehavioraswell:appealstothewelfareofsocietyofgettingvaccinatedhavepositiveeffectsonvaccinationpropensity,butthiseffectdisappearsinpeoplewithfamiliesandchildren.Onthisdemographic,appealstothewelfareofcloselovedonesinsteadappearstohavelargeeffects.InessayIII,Iinvestigatewhethertheprosocialmotivationsunderlyingvaccinationbehaviorareliabletobeaffectedbymotivationcrowding-thatis,whethertheyarecrowdedoutwhenintroducingeconomicincentivestogetvaccinated.Ifindthatonaverage,economicincentivesdonothaveadverseeffects,butforasmallminorityofhighlyprosociallymotivatedpeople,theymight.